Damning criticism of Tony Blair and the way his government led Britain into invading Iraq, and continuing rows over the disclosure of secret documents, have delayed the report of the Chilcot inquiry until well into next summer and possibly much later.
In a statement on its website, posted on Wednesday but pointing only in general terms to the serious difficulties it is confronting, the inquiry panel said: "Pulling together and analysing the evidence and identifying the lessons, for a report that covers so wide and complex a range of issues and a time period of some nine years, is a significant task.
"The inquiry has advised the government that it will need until at least summer 2012 to produce a draft report which will do justice to the issues involved. Very considerable progress has already been made, but there is still much to be done."
The inquiry makes it clear that Whitehall departments are continuing to block the disclosure of documents about the circumstances surrounding the invasion of Iraq.
"The inquiry will need to negotiate the declassification of a significant volume of currently classified material with the government, to enable this to be quoted in, or published alongside [the final report]" the statement said.
"That process has begun, but there will be a series of further major requests as drafting progresses. The inquiry has made clear that it will need co-operation from the government in completing this in a satisfactory and timely manner."
Referring to continuing disputes with Blair and others including, it is believed, Sir Richard Dearlove, the head of MI6 at the time of the war, over the content of the draft report, Wednesday's statement said: "If the inquiry concludes that it wishes to criticise any individual … the individual would be informed of the inquiry's views and offered the opportunity to make representations."
A succession of witnesses, ranging from former cabinet secretaries to military commanders, sharply criticised the way Blair and his close advisers took key decisions without consulting senior ministers and the attorney general, Lord Goldsmith.
The way the notorious, and now discredited, Iraqi weapons dossier was drawn up was heavily criticised, as was the failure to plan for the aftermath of the invasion.
Chilcot has said Blair's claim that MI6 had established "beyond doubt" that Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction was "not possible to make on the basis of intelligence".
Witnesses and documents disclosed to the inquiry suggested Blair agreed "regime change" was the invasion's objective, overriding advice and warnings from the government's lawyers.
Sir Michael Wood, the former senior legal adviser at the Foreign Office, said he considered resigning in protest against the war.
Sir Gus O'Donnell, the cabinet secretary, told the inquiry that the cabinet should have been told of Goldsmith's doubts about the legality of invading Iraq before Blair went to war.
"The ministerial code is very clear about the need, when the attorney general gives written advice, [that] the full text of that advice should be attached [to cabinet papers]," O'Donnell said, implying that Blair had breached the code.
However, the Chilcot inquiry is at odds with O'Donnell, who is blocking the disclosure of notes sent by Blair to George Bush – evidence described by the inquiry as being of "central importance" in establishing the circumstances that led to war.
O'Donnell consulted Blair before suppressing the documents.
Chilcot told O'Donnell early this year: "The question when and how the prime minister made commitments to the US about the UK's involvement in military action in Iraq, and subsequent decisions on the UK's continuing involvement, is central to its considerations."
He refers to passages in memoirs, including Blair's autobiography, A Journey, and disclosures by Jonathan Powell, Blair's chief of staff, and Alastair Campbell, his former head of communications.
Those publications, and the refusal to disclose Blair's notes, Chilcot said, "leads to the position that individuals may disclose privileged information (without sanction) whilst a committee of privy counsellors established by a former prime minister to review the issues cannot".
Chilcot – who, with his four-member panel, has privately seen Blair's notes – said the documents "illuminate prime minister Blair's positions at critical points".
The inquiry opened in November 2009 and ended its public hearings in February 2011. Its report will be submitted to David Cameron before it is published.
Blair's office was not immediately available to comment on Wednesday's statement from the inquiry.
In a statement on its website, posted on Wednesday but pointing only in general terms to the serious difficulties it is confronting, the inquiry panel said: "Pulling together and analysing the evidence and identifying the lessons, for a report that covers so wide and complex a range of issues and a time period of some nine years, is a significant task.
"The inquiry has advised the government that it will need until at least summer 2012 to produce a draft report which will do justice to the issues involved. Very considerable progress has already been made, but there is still much to be done."
The inquiry makes it clear that Whitehall departments are continuing to block the disclosure of documents about the circumstances surrounding the invasion of Iraq.
"The inquiry will need to negotiate the declassification of a significant volume of currently classified material with the government, to enable this to be quoted in, or published alongside [the final report]" the statement said.
"That process has begun, but there will be a series of further major requests as drafting progresses. The inquiry has made clear that it will need co-operation from the government in completing this in a satisfactory and timely manner."
Referring to continuing disputes with Blair and others including, it is believed, Sir Richard Dearlove, the head of MI6 at the time of the war, over the content of the draft report, Wednesday's statement said: "If the inquiry concludes that it wishes to criticise any individual … the individual would be informed of the inquiry's views and offered the opportunity to make representations."
A succession of witnesses, ranging from former cabinet secretaries to military commanders, sharply criticised the way Blair and his close advisers took key decisions without consulting senior ministers and the attorney general, Lord Goldsmith.
The way the notorious, and now discredited, Iraqi weapons dossier was drawn up was heavily criticised, as was the failure to plan for the aftermath of the invasion.
Chilcot has said Blair's claim that MI6 had established "beyond doubt" that Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction was "not possible to make on the basis of intelligence".
Witnesses and documents disclosed to the inquiry suggested Blair agreed "regime change" was the invasion's objective, overriding advice and warnings from the government's lawyers.
Sir Michael Wood, the former senior legal adviser at the Foreign Office, said he considered resigning in protest against the war.
Sir Gus O'Donnell, the cabinet secretary, told the inquiry that the cabinet should have been told of Goldsmith's doubts about the legality of invading Iraq before Blair went to war.
"The ministerial code is very clear about the need, when the attorney general gives written advice, [that] the full text of that advice should be attached [to cabinet papers]," O'Donnell said, implying that Blair had breached the code.
However, the Chilcot inquiry is at odds with O'Donnell, who is blocking the disclosure of notes sent by Blair to George Bush – evidence described by the inquiry as being of "central importance" in establishing the circumstances that led to war.
O'Donnell consulted Blair before suppressing the documents.
Chilcot told O'Donnell early this year: "The question when and how the prime minister made commitments to the US about the UK's involvement in military action in Iraq, and subsequent decisions on the UK's continuing involvement, is central to its considerations."
He refers to passages in memoirs, including Blair's autobiography, A Journey, and disclosures by Jonathan Powell, Blair's chief of staff, and Alastair Campbell, his former head of communications.
Those publications, and the refusal to disclose Blair's notes, Chilcot said, "leads to the position that individuals may disclose privileged information (without sanction) whilst a committee of privy counsellors established by a former prime minister to review the issues cannot".
Chilcot – who, with his four-member panel, has privately seen Blair's notes – said the documents "illuminate prime minister Blair's positions at critical points".
The inquiry opened in November 2009 and ended its public hearings in February 2011. Its report will be submitted to David Cameron before it is published.
Blair's office was not immediately available to comment on Wednesday's statement from the inquiry.
by Richard Norton-Taylor taken from http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2011/nov/16/iraq-inquiry-report-delayed
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